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THOMAS G. PATERSON· 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 
1932-1945. By ROBERT DALLEK. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 
657 pp. 
In so many ways Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1945) wanted to be like his 
famous older cousin, Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919). As Robert Dallek 
notes in the opening pages of his lengthy narrative, both men graduated from 
Harvard University, sat in the New York State legislature, served as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, ran as a vice-presidential candidate, and ultimately 
reached the pinnacle of the Presidency itself. Although they were members of 
different political parties - Franklin was a Democrat and Theodore a 
Republican - they shared similar ideologies; Both Roosevelts were aristocrats 
whofelt an obligation toward people less fortunate than themselves; both were 
cosmopolitan leaders, well-travelled, full of energy and ambition. Like his 
cousin, the young Franklin believed that the United States must assume 
leadership in the world and build a large navy to insure American security and 
prosperity. Before Theodore's death in 1919, both men were expansionists 
and interventionists who held the arrogant belief that Americans knew what 
was best for other societies. "Sooner or later ... the United States must go 
down there and clean up the Mexican political mess," FDR remarked in 
1914.1 
However, in the 1920s and 1930s, FDR sounded less and less like 
Theodore. Always alert to the temper of the times and always the ambitious 
politician who . seldon strayed too far from the domain circumscribed by 
"public opinion," Dallek notes that FDR talked less about military 
preparedness and more about disarmament at a time when Americans were 
disillusioned with the experience of World War I. Responsive to growing 
citicism of United States military intrusions into Latin American, he launched 
the "Good Neighbor Policy." In the 1930s, when Europe and Asia descended 
into diplomatic crises and wars, FDR expressed the prevalent American 
"isolationist" attitude that the United States should not be drawn into foreign 
squabbles and perhaps another world war. He signed the Neutrality Acts as 
barriers to American involvement. Dallek argues that FDR adhered to isola-
tionist slogans only to satiate public opinion and to win votes and that, in fact, 
FDR was still an internationalist, an interventionist, and an advocate of an ac-
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tivist foreign policy. Dallek portrays FDR in the late 1930s as removing his 
isolationist mask to call for repeal of the Neutrality Acts and for providing aid 
to the beleaguered British and French. During the war years, the President 
conducted a foreign policy that led to a victory against totalitarianism. 
Scholars who have attempted to study FDR have been hindered by the fact 
that the President left no diary. They point out that he often neglected to make 
official memoranda of conversations after important meetings with foreign 
diplomats. Moreover, he frequently failed to inform the Department of State 
of his decisions. His letters were often breezy and casual, leaving few traces of 
his inner thoughts. Historians who pursue a study ofFDR must, by necessity, 
rely upon recollections and diaries by associates such as Harry Hopkins, 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Rexford G. Tugwell. FDR's charachter is 
elusive because dissembling was one of his major traits. He was ingratiating, 
witty and evasive, spinning stories when he did not wish to discuss a serious 
matter. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson once grew impatient with the 
President's "confounded happy-go-Iuckiness."2 His contemporaries 
wondered where FDR really stood on certain issues, and scholars today con-
front the same question. 
There is also the problem of FDR's disorganized decision-making pro-
cedures. He conducted a personal diplomacy that often left out the State 
Department. FDR appointed a close friend (Sumner Welles) as Under-
Secretary of State, and a Tennessee politician (Cordell Hull) as Secretary of 
State, to keep the State Department off-balance and internally divided, 
thereby insuring that he was the court oflast resorts. He listened to Welles and 
ignored Hull, causing the latter to grumble that he was "tired of being relied 
upon in public and ignored in private.'" FDR signed agreements with foreign 
leaders without including precise technical language, thereby inviting differ-
ing interpretations of vague words. "Roosevelt never was much of a stickler 
for language," recalled Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. t All in all, 
historians face major obstacles in sketching a complete and convincing portrait 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
It was not surprising that histories ofFDR's diplomacy have varied greatly. 
In his crisp little volume, Roosevelt and World War II,s Robert A. Divine sees 
FDR as a committed isolationist who deeply believed that the United States 
should avoid war and insulate itself from Europe's broils. Arnold Offner, in 
American Appeasement,6 thinks the President was an appeaser-a word that 
Dallek does not use. Dallek comes closest to the thesis of James MacGregor 
2. D. YERGIN, SHATIERED PEACE 43 (1977). 
3. C. THORNE, ALLIES OF A KIND 114 (1978) [hereinafter cited as THORNE]. 
4. W. A. HARRIMAN AND E. ABEL, SPECIAL ENVOY 399 (1975). 
5. R. DEVINE, ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II (1969). 
6. A. OFFNER, AMERICAN ApPEASEMENT (1969). 
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Burns, who, in Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 7 depicts Roosevelt as a politician 
who tailored his foreign policy to his own personal political needs. Dallek 
writes that FDR's isolationism was a facade used to garner votes for his 
domestic New Deal program and re-election. While Divine discusses the 
famous 1936 Chautaugua speech, in which FDR said he hated war, as a true 
reflection of FDR's isolationism, Dallek writes that the address was a political 
gesture. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 is a comprehen-
sive narrative, spiced with quotations from rich archival sources. The story 
moves chronologically through the many issues and crises of international 
relations that FDR faced. There is little analysis; the book is descriptive rather 
than analytical. The tone is defensive. When Dallek concedes criticisms to 
FDR's detractors, he pulls back from judgment himself, pointing out that the 
times were troubled and that domestic constraints handcuffed the President. 
Dallek points out that FDR beliberately deceived the American people,8 used 
the FBI to snoop on his political critics, neglected to develop a viable plan to 
save the EuropeanJews, and was so disorganized that he was unable to launch 
systematic policies. Yet responsibility is usually not pinned on FDR. Dallek 
adsolves FDR by saying that he had no control over events such as the expan-
sionism of Russia, the Chinese civil war, and the rebellions in the colonial 
world, all of which unhinged his hopes for a stable postwar world. True as this 
is, Dallek is remiss in not emphasizing that FDR had the arrogance to think he 
could control them and, in fact, tried to in ways that ultimately undermined 
the national interest or led to subsequent crises. In 1944, journalists Jonathan 
Daniels talked with Roosevelt and recorded this comment: "All throughout 
his conversation he indicated an almost boyish interest in geography, and I got 
the strange impression that in planning the future of the world he was like a 
boy playing trains with the world, setting up cities, planning free towns.' '9 
Dallek places too much emphasis on 'public opinion' and politics. FDR was 
a supreme politician: he read the Gallup polls and he was alert to the power of 
Congress in matters of foreign policy. However, Dallek's treatment of this 
theme is confusing. He was the President bowing to public opinion in some in-
stances (Neutrality Acts) aQd -forthrightly rejecting the opinion expressed in 
other circumstances (cutting off war-related goods to Japan). Dallek too fre-
quently attributes FDR's behavior to deference to an isolationist sentiment 
without providing direct evidence of such influence. If FDR believed as pro-
foundly as Dallek says he did in an activist, interventionist foreign policy 
before the late 1930s, why did he not try to persuade opinion to follow his 
lead? Afterall, persuation was FDR's forte. I came away from the book uncon-
7. J. M. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox (1956). 
8. E.g., the Greer incident. 
9. J. DANIELS, WHITE HOUSE WITNESS 22, 12 (1975). 
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vinced that FDR was secretly an interventionist. Rather, he was a mixture of 
an expedient politician, and an isolationist who like many Americans in the 
1930s was groping for a foreign policy that fit times of agression, 
totalitarianism, and war. FDR was far more confused and uncertain than 
Dallek suggests. 
In his treatment of World War II diplomacy, Dallek highlights the follow-
ing: Churchill's influence over FDR; FDR's utter dislike of Charles 
DeGaulle; and Roosevelt's attempts to elevate Chaing Kai-shek's China to a 
great power status as an American ally. Dallek also emphasized the 
President's decision to grab Pacific inlands as future American bases, his 
search for accommodation with Russia and his growing suspicion of Soviet in-
tentions. Dallek depicts Roosevelt as a hard-headed diplomat who sought to 
expand American interests and who understood the machinations of global 
politics. The author notes that FDR saw the atomic bomb as a potential 
diplomatic weapon to pry concessions from Moscow. However, he neglects to 
mention that FDR saw foreign aid, especially a large postwar loan that Russia 
requested, as another lever for persuading the Russians to accept American 
plans for the postwar world. Dallek's conclusion that "had he lived, Roosevelt 
would probably moved more quickly than Truman to confront the 
Russians"IO is dubious. FDR had much at stake in seeing his schemes for 
cooperation come to fruition. His style, and his willingness to understand 
Russian fears and goals, stood in stark contrast to Truman's "give-ern-hell" 
style and impatience. It is doubtful that FDR would have moved more quickly 
than Truman to abandon the Yalta agreements that he had worked so hard to 
craft. In light of considerable recent scholarship, it appears that the United 
States could have taken steps to reduce postwar tension especially since the 
Cold War cannot be attributed solely to the suspicions of the Russians. 11 
The weakest parts of Dallek's study concern the "Third World," where, in 
the 1930s and 1940s, the beginnings of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist 
stirrings were evident. For example, Dallek accepts FDR's own assessment 
that the new emphasis on the Good Neighbor Policy was a major departure in 
American foreign policy. Dallek's analysis is superficial. David Green's Con-
tainment of Latin America,t2 has demonstrated that the Good Neighbor Policy 
was more a change in tactics to insure continued United States hegemony in 
Latin America than a giving up of that hegemony. The Good Neighbor Policy 
did not lead to the excellent relations that Dallek finds. When Dallek discusses 
Under-Secretary of State Welles' subversive activities against the revolu-
tionary government of Grau San Martin in Cuba in 1933-1934, he fails to 
point out how angry Cubans were with United States interventionism. Dallek 
10. DALLEK, supra note 1 at 534. 
11. Set T. PATTERSON, ON EVERY FRONT (1979) for a synthesis ofrecent works on the issue. 
12. D. GREEN, CONTAINMENT OF LATIN AMERICA (1971). 
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cites a 1936 treaty with Panama as another triumph of the new policy. This 
treatyl! increased the United States annuity payment to Panama for use of the 
Canal and gave Panama certain rights of nationhood that the American 
presence previously had held back. But Dallek's research and understanding 
of this treaty fall short. In his recent study, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in 
Historical Perspective, It Walter LaFeber notes that the increased annuity was 'il-
lusory' because FDR had devalued the dollar. Moreover, the United States 
Senate did not ratify the treaty for three years, arousing Panama's bitterness 
month by month. LeFeber concludes: "As the two nations prepared for world 
war, Panamanians were embittered that they had received less than had been 
promised in 1936. "15 Indeed, the 1936 treaty was used to justify a United 
States seizure of more Panamanian territory in 1940, another fact that Dallek 
fails to mention in his flawed treatment of the Good Neighbor Policy. 
There are also shortcoming in Dallek's discussion of FDR's retreat from 
anti-colonial ideas. FDR was highly critical of the French record in Indochina. 
Early in the war, he repeatedly argued that the French should not be per-
mitted to return and that Indochina should enjoy some degree of autonomy -
perhaps under a trusteeship governed by the United Nations Organization. 
But in the last months before his death, FDR acquiesced in the restoration of 
French colonial rule in Indochina. As Dallek correctly emphasizes, FDR did 
not want to anger the French, whose cooperation he sought in the postwar 
peace in Europe, and he could not rely on the weak Chinese to take on 
management duties in Indochina. Like many Americans, FDR was intolerant 
of native peoples who wished to chart their own destiny: he believed that col-
onial peoples were not ready for self-government and was condescending 
toward darker-skinned peoples. FDR stated that colonial peoples were 
"backward" and needed to be educated by others. 16 FDR was patronizing, if 
not racist, toward Third World Nations. He mocked Burmese leaders in a 
1942 letter to Churchill: "I never liked the Burmese and you people must have 
had a terrible time with them the last fifty years. Thank the Lord you have 
He-Saw, We-Saw, You-Saw under lock and key."17 It was FDR who said that 
the Japanese were aggressive because their skulls were less developed than 
those of Caucasians, the Vietnamese were "of small stature ... and not 
warlike," 18 and the Puerto Rican birthrate might be curbed by mass steriliza-
tion. 19 One wonders, in considering statements like these-, conspicuously miss-
ing in Dallek's work, just how anti-colonialist FDR was. 
13. Treaty with Panama on Friendship and 'Cooperation, United States· Panama, Mar. 2, 
1936,53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945. 
14. W. LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1978). 
15. /d. at 87·88. 
16. THORNE, supra note 3, at 6. 
17. /d. at 8. 
18. /d. at 159. 
19. /d. at 457. 
